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ABSTRACT 
This study explores shareholder influence on corporations with regards to corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). It is based on interviews with corporate representatives, 
investors  and  consultants.    The  study  finds  that  that  while  corporations  do  not 
perceive socially and environmentally minded shareholders to have a significant 
influence on how corporations address CSR, these shareholders are deemed as a 
legitimate  and  important  stakeholder.  Corporations  find  that  investors  amplify 
general stakeholder pressure, and that they can function as a catalyst for CSR by 
adding  legitimacy  to  the  work  of  CSR  professionals.  The  one  area  where 
shareholders stand out as having a concrete influence is with regards to corporate 
transparency on CSR. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This  paper  is  addressing  shareholders’  involvement  in  contributing  towards  a 
socially and environmentally sustainable development. Whereas the financial sector 
has  long  been  regarded  as  disconnected  from  the  agendas  of  social  and 
environmental organisations and activists groups, their interests are – to a limited 
but  growing  extent  –  merging.  Shareholders,  too,  are  now  putting  pressure  on 
corporations to improve their environmental records and to respect human rights. 
In  recent  years,  there  has  been  a  rise  in  shareholder  interest  in  social  and 
environmental aspects of corporate strategies and operations. While in 1970 only 
two shareholder proposals were submitted to US corporations’ annual meetings on a 
social  or  environmental  issue,  the  2006  proxy  season  saw  367  such  proposals, 
submitted by investors who in total controlled USD 739 billion in assets (Vogel, 
1983;  SIF,  2007).  While  in  the  early  1980s,  Europe  had  four  publicly  offered 
investment  funds  that  based  their  inclusion  criteria  not  only  on  conventional 
financial parameters but also on ethical, environmental or social dimensions, there 
are  now  over  400  such  funds  (Avanzi  SRI  Research,  2007).  To  put  things  in 
perspective, however, it should be noted that the assets controlled by the explicitly 
socially and environmentally minded investors are more limited in size than those 
of  the  mainstream  investor  community;  in  Europe  the  green/social/ethical  funds 
represented  17,6%  of  total  assets  of  publicly  offered  open-end  funds  in  2008 
(Eurosif, 2008).   
The  investment  approach  which  often  is  referred  to  as  socially  responsible 
investment, or SRI, ranges from the systematic exclusion of unwanted sectors such 
as  tobacco  or  armament,  to  including  social  and  environmental  criteria  when 
building a portfolio, and even to actively engaging with corporations in order to 
improve  their  social  and  environmental  performance.  It  is  this  last  part,  active 
engagement, which this paper will address. 
The motivation for investors to engage with corporations with regards to corporate 
social  responsibility  (CSR)  may  be  ethical,  for  example  on  the  grounds  that 
corporations are assumed to have a moral obligation to respect human rights, to 
safeguard the environment, or to ensure fair labour conditions. The motivation may 
also  be  financial;  some  argue  that  corporations  who  address  social  and 4 
 
environmental issues not only mitigate risks such as reputational damage or law 
suits, but also that efforts to improve social and environmental aspects can create 
business value and be positively correlated with financial performance (c.f. meta-
studies on the topic by Orlitzky et al, 2003 and Margolis et al, 2006).  
As  the  phenomenon  of  SRI  grows,  there  is  a  mounting  expectation  that  SRI-
oriented shareholders can indeed influence corporations to do better, and to improve 
their record with regards to CSR (Rivoli, 2003). When in 2006 a UN-led initiative 
launched  Principles  of  Responsible  Investments,  open  for  the  wider  investment 
community to sign on to, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed:  
 
“By incorporating environmental, social and governance criteria into their investment 
decision-making and ownership practices, the signatories to the Principles are directly 
influencing  companies  to  improve  performance  in  these  areas.  This,  in  turn,  is 
contributing to our efforts to promote good corporate citizenship and to build a more 
stable, sustainable and inclusive global economy.” (www.unpri.org) 
 
As a further example, the membership association Social Investment Forum states 
on its web site: 
 
 ”With SRI, investors can put their money to work to build a more sustainable world 
while earning competitive returns both today and over time.” (www.socialinvest.org) 
 
Shareholders’  potential  to  influence  corporations  with  regard  to  CSR  is  also 
expressed  by  the  corporate  sector  itself;  Surveys  show  that  shareholders’ 
expectations  are  one  of  the  top  motivations  for  corporations  to  address  CSR 
(Arlbjørn et al, 2008; Amnesty Business Group, 2008). 
At the same time, few attempts have been made by researchers to understand if 
shareholders  are in  fact  having such influence  on corporations.  The aim  of this 
study is therefore to explore the influence that shareholders have on corporations in 5 
 
terms of CSR
1. Specifically, the study will garner corporations’ own perceptions of 
this.  
This study complements and extends previous research in a number of ways. While 
earlier studies on the influence of investors on corporations with regard to CSR 
have analysed shareholder interactions with a single corporation (Hoffman, 1996), 
this study is including 20 corporations, for a broader view. Further, while other 
studies have used the score on a social and environmental rating as a proxy for 
shareholder influence (Neubaum & Zahra, 2006; David et al, 2007) this study is 
basing  its  results  on  interviews  with  corporations,  to  allow  for  a  more 
contextualised and multifaceted (less binary) view of shareholder influence. Finally, 
while  other  studies  have  focused  on  the  possible  effects  of  formal  shareholder 
resolutions on corporate behaviour (Engle, 2006; David et al, 2007) this study is 
focusing on more interactive means of engagement, most notably dialogues.  
It  should  be  noted  that  in  the  present  study  the  term  shareholder  refers  to 
institutional shareholders (i.e. investors who manage assets on behalf of others by 
pooling large sums of money, e.g. pension funds and mutual funds), as these are the 
type of shareholder who most often actively engage with corporations. I use the 
terms shareholder and investor interchangeably. 
In  the  next  section,  I  will  put  this  study  in  context  by  reviewing  some  of  the 
literature on stakeholder salience in general and shareholder influence in particular. 
After this, the collected interview data is presented, followed by a discussion of the 
results. 
 
SHAREHOLDER INFUENCE IN THE LITERATURE  
R. Edward Freeman has famously defined stakeholders as “any group or individual 
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” 
(Freeman,  1984:  46).  By  definition,  this  includes  shareholders  as  well  as  other 
corporate constituents inside or outside the boundaries of the corporation. 
                                                 
1 CSR is a broad concept which refers to business responsibility for the environment and for social 
matters, such as human rights and labour conditions. For reviews of the evolution of the definitional 
construct of CSR, see e.g. Carroll (1999) and Windell (2006). 6 
 
In  literature  about  the  corporation  and  its  obligations  to  external  parties, 
shareholders and stakeholders are however often juxtaposed, and are supposed to 
represent  different  interests,  such  as  the  dollar  versus  the  environment.  Further, 
scholars can be distinguished as either purporting shareholder value as a superior 
priority for corporations (e.g. Friedman, 1970) or as arguing that other stakeholder 
interests are equally important (e.g. Freeman, 1984).  
SRI-oriented shareholders are however having a dual interest: Besides their obvious 
role  as  investors,  where  their  stake  in  corporations  stems  from  their  ownership 
position and the primary claim is financial return on investment, they also represent 
other interests such as clean air and human rights. These concerns may be shared 
with other types of stakeholders, such as environmental groups, local communities, 
and human rights advocates.  
For the purpose of this particular study, and given that corporations normally cannot 
consider  each  and  every  constituent’s  expectations,  it  is  pertinent  to  understand 
what makes a stakeholder salient. What is it that makes corporations pay attention 
to certain stakeholders, and can SRI-oriented shareholders be part of this group?  
Salience refers to stakeholders’ significance or prominence, and the attention and 
priority  that  are  accorded  to  them  by  the  organisations  to  which  they  are 
stakeholders.  A  more  salient  stakeholder  has  a  better  chance  to  influence  an 
organisation  than  a  less  salient  stakeholder,  and  stakeholder  salience  is  thus 
indicative  of  which  stakeholders  can  influence  managerial  action.  According  to 
Mitchell et al (1997), salient stakeholders share one or more of these features: (a) 
They  have  power  to  influence  the  corporation,  (b)  their  relationship  with  the 
corporation is legitimate, and/or (c) they have urgent claims on the corporation. If a 
stakeholder has only one of these features, it is considered a latent relationship: the 
stakeholder  may  not  give  considerate  attention  to  the  corporation  and  the 
corporation  may  not  give  considerate  attention  to  the  stakeholder.  A  salient 
stakeholder, on the other hand, shares at least two of the attributes, for example 
power and legitimacy, or urgency and power.  
Conventional  as  well  as  SRI-oriented  investors  would  typically  belong  to  this 
group; their ownership standing gives them power as well as legitimacy in making 7 
 
claims on the corporation. The power position is primarily related to the fact that 
corporations depend on shareholders for access  to capital, and that shareholders 
have the right to vote or at least to express their opinion in shareholder meetings 
(these rights may vary in different countries and depending on the class of stock). 
Shareholders’ legitimacy is confirmed by formal mechanisms within corporations, 
for  example  the  presence  of  an  investor  relationship  officer,  shareholder 
representatives  on  the  board,  and  corporate  reports  which  specifically  target 
shareholders.  Further,  adding  to  the  power  and  legitimacy  of  shareholders, 
corporations are bound by fiduciary duties to act in the interest of their owners. 
Some corporations may however be of the opinion that SRI-oriented shareholders 
are activists in disguise, and in fact not legitimate stakeholders, and therefore ignore 
their claims. 
If a stakeholder were to have all three attributes – power, legitimacy and urgency – 
its salience would increase (Mitchell et al, 1997). Urgency refers to the degree to 
which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention, and will be determined by 
the degree to which a corporations’ delay in attending to the claim is unacceptable 
to the stakeholder and the degree to which the claim is important to the stakeholder 
(Mitchell et al, 1997). For example, issues of great public concern may be deemed 
as particularly urgent. In the context of SRI-oriented shareholders, urgency can for 
example  be  related  to  the  nature  of  the  topics  that  they  bring  up  in  personal 
meetings with corporations, the types of questions that they may pose in annual 
general meetings, or the extent to which they use media to add pressure. 
Neubaum and Zahra (2006), who have studied the influence of shareholders on 
corporate performance in the area of CSR, attribute shareholder salience to three 
factors:  First,  long-term investors, e.g. pension  funds, will be more salient  than 
other investors, as corporations are more reliant and dependent on these for access 
to capital than on short-term owners. Second, the extent to which these long-term 
shareholders actively engage with corporations also determines how salient they 
are; put simply, more activity generates more influence. Third, the authors find that 
the  level  of  coordinated  activism  between  shareholders  will  also  affect  their 
salience. This supports a study by Rowley (1997), a stakeholder theorist who – 8 
 
based on social network analysis – suggests that stakeholders are more salient the 
more interconnected they are. 
A study by Hoffman (1996) provides further insight to this phenomenon: Hoffman 
followed  the  dynamic  process  of  how  environmentally  concerned  shareholders 
sought to influence an oil corporation to adopt a set of environmental principles. 
Hoffman attributes the success of shareholders to three factors: corporate culture 
and the fit between this and the shareholder claims, the power and influence of the 
shareholders, and the political climate in which the claim was made. This overlaps 
with the aforementioned study by Mitchell et al (1997), as a fit between stakeholder 
claims and  corporate culture  adds  legitimacy  to the matter,  while a  fit  between 
stakeholder  claims  and  the  political  climate  in  the  industry  can  add  a  sense  of 
urgency. 
Haigh and Hazelton (2004) argue that the current market share of SRI funds is too 
small  to  have  significant  influence.  The  authors  suggest  that  investors’  impact 
would likely increase if they were to act in concert to a greater extent; something 
which is in line with the studies by Neubaum and Zahra (2006) and Rowley (1997).  
While the studies referred to here have focused on what makes SRI shareholders 
salient and influential, additional studies have addressed what the actual outcomes 
of shareholder influence can be on corporations.  
Based on anecdotal evidence, O’Rourke (2003) suggests that one important effect 
of SRI-oriented shareholders’ activities may be that corporations can learn from the 
explicit social and environmental criteria that investors and analysts use to compose 
investment funds and indexes. The investment criteria can guide corporations in 
prioritising and organising their own work on social and environmental matters. It 
can also educate investor relations officers about these issues, and it may empower 
environmental managers within the company.  
In  the  aforementioned  study  by  Hoffman  (1996),  concerning  how  shareholders 
sought to influence an oil corporation to adopt a set of environmental principles, he 
shows empirically that shareholders can indeed influence corporations to adhere to 
specific shareholder goals. Whereas the targeted corporation was reluctant at first, 
the  parties  eventually  reached  a  compromise  and  the  oil  company  used  the 9 
 
opportunity  to  induce  an  industry-wide  change.  Hoffman  notes  that  shareholder 
influence is a dynamic and reciprocal process where shareholders themselves may 
be influenced by the very perspectives they try to change.  
Additionally,  Van  Buren  and  Paul  (2000)  have  used  the  stakeholder  salience 
framework  by  Mitchell  et  al  (1997)  in  order  to  explore  the  influence  of  SRI-
oriented  investors.  In  a  survey  study,  corporate  respondents  rated  SRI-oriented 
shareholders negatively on all three dimensions (power, legitimacy and urgency). 
The authors find that SRI-oriented investors are seen by corporate management as 
espousing  “illegitimate”  claims,  and  that  the  goals  of  these  investors  are  not 
convergent with the values or norms of business. Related to this, David et al (2007) 
argue that shareholder proposals can prompt corporations to spend more resources 
on  resisting  the  claims,  thus  suggesting  that  shareholder  attempts  to  influence 
corporations may be counterproductive if claims are viewed as illegitimate. At the 
same time, Van Buren and Paul (2000) conclude that the activities by SRI-oriented 
investors have contributed to raising awareness of corporate responsibility issues in 
the business sector, and that it has influenced the debate of what good corporate 
social performance entails.  
In summary, then, previous literature suggests that shareholders are theoretically in 
a  good  position  to  influence  corporations  with  regard  to  CSR,  while  empirical 
results  are  inconclusive.  This  study  aims  at  exploring  shareholder  influence 
empirically. The intention is not to test theory, but rather to add to current insights 
on the topic of shareholder influence with regard to CSR.  
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
This exploratory study is set in Sweden. Data was collected trough semi-structured 
interviews with representatives of twenty corporations, six institutional investors, 
and two engagement consultants. It was natural to include corporations since the 
study seeks to understand corporations’ own perception of shareholder influence. I 
chose to also include investors and consultants in order to also understand the view 
of those who seek to influence corporations, for a balanced and more encompassing 
understanding of the studied phenomenon.  10 
 
Interviews  were  deemed  an  appropriate  method  since  I  was  interested  in  the 
accounts of the respondents, something which would be more difficult to capture 
through a survey study (Creswell, 2003). It allowed for the respondents to elaborate 
freely on each question, and it allowed me to follow up with additional questions 
for clarification. 
To select corporations, I first asked a number of Swedish institutional investors who 
are typically engaging with corporations on CSR how they make their selection. 
The investors tend to mainly contact large cap corporations, but with no particular 
sector bias. I therefore selected corporations from the large cap list of the OMX 
Nordic Exchange, with a spread between different sectors. These are displayed in 
Table 1 here below. At each corporation, the person who most often handle the 
contacts  with  the  SRI-oriented  investor  community  was  interviewed;  for  some 
corporations  this  turned  out  to  be  the  investor  relations  officer,  for  others  a 
dedicated sustainability officer, and yet others a communications officer. In a few 
cases, the corporation suggested that I interview more than one representative. The 
corporation, the sector, and the respondents’ areas of responsibility are displayed in 
Table 1. 
Corporation  Sector  Respondent’s area of responsibility 
ABB  Heavy electrical equipment  Sustainability Affairs 
Assa Abloy  Building products  Corporate Communications 
AstraZeneca  Pharmaceuticals  Corporate Responsibility + Information 
Atlas Copco  Industrial machinery  Corporate Communications 
Autoliv  Auto parts and equipment  Corporate Communications 
Axfood  Food retail  Investor Relations 
Axis  Communications equipment  Investor Relations and Corporate Comm. 
Ericsson  Communications equipment  Investor Relations 
H&M  Apparel retail  Corporate Communications 
Investor  Multi-sector holdings  Corporate Communications 
JM  Real estate management and development  Quality and Environment 
Lundin Mining  Diversified metals and mining  Investor Relations 
Oriflame  Personal products  Investor Relations 
SCA  Paper products  Environment + CSR/Human Resources 
Scania  Construction and farm machinery, Heavy trucks  Investor Relations 
Swedish Match  Tobacco  Investor Relations + Human Resources 
TeliaSonera  Integrated telecommunications services  Corporate Responsibility 
Trelleborg  Industrial machinery  Corporate Communications 
Volvo  Construction and farm machinery, Heavy trucks  Investor Relations + Public Affairs 
Vostok Nafta  Multi-sector holdings  Investor Relations and Corporate Comm. 
Table 1: List of interviewed corporations 11 
 
Most  of  the  interviewed  corporations  are  only  listed  in  Sweden,  and  in  the 
interviews, the corporations largely referred to Swedish SRI-oriented investors, but 
sometimes also to foreign SRI-oriented investors.  
To select investors to interview, I asked the corporate respondents which investors 
had engaged with them with regards to CSR. There was general agreement among 
the interviewed companies that conventional investors (who are not explicitly SRI-
oriented)  show  little  interest  in  environmental  and  social  issues,  and  that  these 
investors generally do not pose questions about CSR topics. Thus, the interaction 
that corporations have with investors on CSR is with those who have explicitly 
made SRI a part of their investment approach, and I therefore chose to exclusively 
interview SRI-oriented investors. 
The  corporate  respondents  mentioned  a  total  of  six  Sweden-based  SRI-oriented 
investors that had engaged with them, and I therefore chose to interview all of these. 
They are listed in Table 2. For each organisation, I interviewed a professional who 
is in charge of engagement practices for SRI. 
 
Investor org.  Type of investor  Respondent’s title 
AP1  Public pension fund  Head of corporate communications 
AP2  Public pension fund  Head of corporate governance and communications 
AP3  Public pension fund  Communications manager 
Banco  Asset manager  Head of responsible investment 
Folksam  Asset manager / Insurance company  Head of responsible investment 
Swedbank Robur  Asset manager  Head of responsible investment 
Table 2: List of interviewed investors 
 
I  also  interviewed  SRI  engagement  consultants.  These  are  organisations  which 
assist investors in engagement activities, such as letter writing or dialogues with the 
purpose  to  influence  corporations  with  regard  to  CSR.  When  they  meet  with 
corporations  for  engagement  purposes,  they  represent  investors.  The  same 
organisations often support investors with information about corporations from a 
CSR perspective, and in this role they are typically referred to as SRI analysts.  To 
select engagement consultants to interview, I asked the interviewed corporations as 
well as investors which (Swedish) engagement consultants they interact with. These 
are listed in Table 3. 12 
 
 
Organisation  Respondent’s title 
Ethix  Head of corporate engagement 
GES  President and managing director 
Table 3: List of interviewed engagement consultants 
 
Interviews were conducted during autumn 2007 and spring 2008. Interviews lasted 
for approximately 1 hour and with a few exceptions they were conducted face-to-
face  (otherwise  over  the  phone,  due  to  geographical  distance).  The  transcribed 
interviews were coded for recurrent themes, which allowed me to identify patterns 
in the material, and to conduct an analysis of shareholder influence. 
 
RESULTS 
Before getting into detail about the results of the study, something should be said 
about the context in which the interaction between SRI-oriented investors and the 
interviewed corporations take place.   
 
Contextual background 
The majority of the corporate respondents meet with SRI-oriented investors on a 
continuous basis; with some once every year, and with others more often. Contacts 
tend to be bi-lateral, most often in personal meetings but sometimes also over the 
phone. Occasionally, corporations are contacted by investors through letter writing. 
Contacts  are  almost  exclusively  initiated  by  the  investors.  In  addition  to  this, 
analysts (particularly foreign) are sending questionnaires in order to gather data, for 
example for market indexes which uses environmental and social screens. 
Another point of contact is that CSR professionals within corporations sometimes 
ask investors for input on their work, for example on their sustainability report or a 
policy  they  are  drafting.  Two  of  the  interviewed  corporations  have  gathered 
investors  to  roundtable  meetings  or  presentations,  as  a  way  to  get  input  and 
feedback from the investors and as an opportunity for investors to ask questions.  
Sometimes investors are visiting corporations’ suppliers or work sites in a foreign 
country, either upon invitation from the corporation or on their own initiative. The 13 
 
purpose  of  these  visits  is  for  investors  to  inform  themselves  about  social  and 
environmental conditions and routines at these sites, either as a form of audit or to 
get familiar with the scene on a more general level.  
In contrast to for example corporations in the  US, the annual general meeting is not 
used  as  an  arena  for  environmental  and  social  responsibility  issues  for  the 
interviewed  Swedish  corporations.  Whereas  corporate  governance  has  a  natural 
place  at  these  AGMs,  such  as  board  nominations  and  remunerations,  the 
interviewed corporations testify that shareholders rarely or never bring up CSR in 
this forum. Further, it is unusual that the interviewed corporations proactively use 
this forum to share information about their CSR work with its shareholders. 
 
The investor view 
In order to understand the influence that investors can have on corporations in terms 
of CSR, it is relevant to also understand the drivers for investors’ engagement with 
portfolio  companies,  and  what  they  are  trying  to  achieve.  Three  out  of  the  six 
investors  in  this  study  are  public  pension  funds,  and  they  are  obliged  by  a 
governmental directive to include a CSR perspective in their investments. Yet, they 
do not do this only out of obligation, but are motivating their involvement in CSR 
by the business case they find lies therein, for example that it makes corporations 
more  competitive.  All  the  interviewed  investors  are  largely  referring  to  risk 
management, and to some extent business opportunities, when prompted about why 
they seek to influence corporations with regards to CSR. Partly, it is also viewed as 
a moral issue. Says one investor: 
 
“[We  do  it]  because  we  think  it  is  the  winning  company  in  the  long  term, 
absolutely. /…/ Good risk management allows for good business positioning 
with regards to these issues. And I also feel that we have no choice. The future 
doesn’t have any choice and everybody has to take responsibility, corporations 
and everyone else.” (Banco) 
 
The  goal  with  corporate  engagement  practices,  according  to  investors,  is  to 




An important stakeholder 
According  to  the  interviews  with  corporate  representatives  for  this  study,  the 
corporations  generally perceive that  SRI-oriented investors have some but not a 
major influence on how they handle matters that fall within the category of CSR. 
Many of the interviewed corporations state that while investors sometimes seek to 
influence corporations on specific issues, they tend to primarily ask for information 
in order to get an update on what the corporations do with regards to CSR. This is 
however not to say that the SRI-oriented investors are not viewed as important or 
valued  stakeholders,  but  not  so  much  in  terms  of  direct  influence  on  CSR 
operations. In fact, a number of respondents express that SRI-oriented investors are 
“important to us” and that they value the dialogue they are having, but are unable to 
provide a specific example of how they have made a difference to the work that the 
corporation does with regards to CSR.  
According  to  corporate  respondents,  the  meetings  they  have  with  investors  can 
provide good input to their CSR operations even if it doesn’t change it, not the least 
by validating that the corporation is on the right track and makes the right priorities.  
 
“I  think  investors  have  an  impact  in  saying  that  this  is  an  area  that  is 
important, and we should spend time on it. We are already working with it 
internally and are ahead of the investors in many respects […] but I think 
that it becomes an additional confirmation that it is important to work with 
these questions.” (Scania) 
 
Amplifying stakeholder pressure 
One  reason  that  corporations  perceive  SRI-oriented  investors  as  having  limited 
influence may be that it is difficult to distinguish investor influence from that of 
other stakeholders. Many corporations express that they perceive the views of SRI-
oriented investors as part of an overall external pressure. SRI-oriented investors 
sustain or amplify opinions that are also expressed by others, rather than being the 
only  ones  to  focus  on  something.  Investors  are  one  source  of  influence  among 
many,  along  with  for  example  customers,  the  general  public,  media,  and 
regulations. Several corporations also say that investors are not forerunners; rather, 15 
 
they support or amplify a critical trend. Further, many respondents state that when a 
change occurs due to stakeholder pressure, investors are rarely the only source.  
 
“It is rare that an investor forwards a totally unique request. Rather, it is 
often something which is a hot topic at the moment and where they become 
one voice among many. Taken together this may cause us to go a certain 
way.” (H&M) 
 
Says  one  pharmaceutical  corporation,  who  has  repeatedly  been  contacted  by  a 
shareholder group regarding access to drugs: 
 
“It has been such as wide debate about these questions generally, so I can’t 
say that specifically that initiative [had a significant influence]. But this has 
been a prioritised question for us because of all the debate in that group and 
in other groups with other stakeholders. So it is difficult to say that it is 
specifically  connected  to  them,  I  wouldn’t  say  that,  but  of  course  it 
contributed. It was one additional dialogue.” (AstraZeneca) 
 
Investors and engagement consultants share the view that influence is a joint effort, 
and they make clear that influence can rarely be traced back to one single investor.  
 
I think it is difficult to ever say that our activities by Ethix made this large 
corporation change. We have a part in it. (Ethix) 
 
Corporate transparency 
Even  if  corporations  in  most  cases  perceive  investors  as  having  limited  direct 
impact on CSR, there is one important exception where investors have significant 
direct influence, and that is transparency. Whereas investors are for the most part 
not  challenging  the  interviewed  corporations  on  achieving  higher  environmental 
targets  or  addressing  social  malpractices,  they  are  successfully  persuading 
corporations  to  report  more  extensively  on  their  web  sites  and  in  their  annual 
reports, and to be more detailed about their progress with regards to CSR.  
A number of corporations say that their values are “ingrained in the walls” of the 
organisation so they haven’t seen a need to write down how they handle different 
aspects of CSR until investors started to ask for it. Further, not only have investors 16 
 
encouraged  them  to  report  more  extensively  and  in  more  detail,  but  they  also 
influence what corporations choose to report on: 
 
“Sometimes we haven’t realised that it could be important to report certain 
information. Of course it influences us if we notice that they are interested 
in a certain question or a certain angle. We try to increase our transparency 
on  the  issues  they  are  interested  in.  It  doesn’t  influence  how  we  work 
directly but it influences what information we choose to focus on in our 
internal and external communications” (SCA) 
 
While  some  of  the  corporate  respondents  view  the  writing  of  reports  and 
documenting of policies as something which steals time from the “actual” CSR 
work, others find that transparency adds value because it helps the corporation to 
keep track of its progress in critical areas.  
When prompted on why they largely limit their efforts to influencing transparency 
and reporting, one investor says that this is where they have an opportunity to have 
an influence, rather than on a detailed level. Several investors point out that it is not 
within their mandate to micro-manage and to point out exactly what corporations 
should do. Others emphasise that it is difficult to raise relevant issues for discussion 
if  corporations  have  not  first  communicated  what  they  do,  so  transparency  is 
therefore a priority in the dialogue meetings with corporations.  
 
CSR operations 
A few corporations were however able to give examples of tangible influence in 
addition to increased transparency. For example, one corporation adopted a group 
wide environmental policy and group wide environmental goals as a direct result of 
investor  pressure;  two  corporations  have  made  improvements  to  their  whistle 
blowing routines; one corporation joined an industry initiative to discuss certain 
critical issues; one company updated their ethical guidelines for business in low cost 
countries; and one company is exploring how they can turn environmental threats 
into business opportunities, all based on investors’ engagement in these issues.  
Typically, corporations accept investor requests and suggestions, and view them as 
good advice rather than an obstruction to their work. From time to time, however, 17 
 
corporations  reject  investors’ suggestions  for change, when it  conflicts  with  the 
organisations’  priorities.  For  example,  when  one  investor  asked  a  number  of 
corporations to map their entire supply chain, some of the interviewed corporations 
found that this was not feasible, either because they deemed this to be sensitive 
information from a competitor perspective or because the supplier base was too 
large to keep track of. One corporation was asked to abandon a certain supplier that 
did not meet the investor’s expectations on social responsibility, but did not do so: 
“We  cannot  change  suppliers  just  because  [investor]  says  so.”  (Corporate 
representative) At the same time, most of the interviewed corporations appreciate 
the contacts with SRI-oriented investors, and they feel that investors have matured 
over the past few years, meaning that they ask more informed questions and have 
less of a black-and-white approach to CSR.  
 
Legitimacy to CSR  
Investors  and  engagement  consultants  emphasise that one important  outcome of 
shareholder pressure, in their view, is empowerment of those in charge of CSR 
within the corporations: 
 
 “We often meet CSR professionals and for their legitimacy in the organisation 
they need to meet investors and be able to say that shareholders are in fact 
raising these concerns. /... / We help those who are responsible for this within 
the corporations to make room for themselves.” (AP1) 
 
This was also mentioned by some of the corporate respondents: 
 
 “It is also helping my argumentation internally; I can point out that we are 
listed on the stock exchange in Sweden and that Swedish ethical investors have 
this view.” (Assa Abloy) 
 
A prerequisite for this to work, however, is that the corporation has established 
communication channels to enable input from investors to be communicated further 
within  the  organisation.  This  seems  to  be  in  place  with  most  interviewed 
corporations,  who  typically  share  and  discuss  topics  that  have  been  covered  in 18 
 
investor meetings with regards to CSR with top executives, the CEO, the board, or a 
sustainability council within the firm.  
 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION  
This empirically focused study has aimed to explore the influence that shareholders 
have on corporations in terms of CSR.  
The results of this study can be summarized in four points: 
1.  Corporations view SRI-oriented shareholders as legitimate and important 
stakeholders.  
2.  Corporations  perceive  that  in  general,  shareholders  do  not  have  a 
significant influence on how they address CSR.  
3.  Investors influence corporations indirectly, by providing legitimacy to CSR, 
and by amplifying general stakeholder expectations. 
4.  Investors  influence  corporations  directly,  primarily  with  regards  to 
improved  transparency  on  CSR,  but  sometimes  regarding  operational 
aspects. 
Corporations perceive SRI-oriented shareholders as salient, but their influence may 
be intangible and indirect. They amplify already existing stakeholder expectations, 
and influence can rarely be traced back to one single investor. At the same time, it 
may be through indirect influence that investors have their most important part to 
play as a change agent: This interview study empirically supports the suggestion 
forwarded by O’Rourke (2003) that shareholders may empower corporate managers 
to  attend  to  CSR.  Interviewed  corporations  and  investors  alike  find  that  SRI-
oriented investors provide increased legitimacy to CSR executives and departments, 
and can be a catalyst for CSR to move higher up on the corporate agenda. It is likely 
that such a facilitating role is important for CSR to be recognised as a strategic and 
value-driving area in the corporate sector at large.   
This insight is an important contribution of this study, as it shows that investor 
influence may reach beyond what can be captured through environmental ratings 
and other such quantitative measures.   19 
 
As suggested by previous studies, stakeholders who are viewed as legitimate have a 
better chance to influence corporations (Mitchell et al, 1997). This study finds that 
SRI-oriented  shareholders  have  a  legitimate  relationship  with  corporations,  as 
evidenced,  for  example,  by  respondents’  statements  that  these  shareholders  are 
valued stakeholders and that their contacts are appreciated by the corporation. The 
interviewed corporations do not question investors’ interest in CSR. Apparently, 
investors are deemed as important to the corporation also when they do not attempt 
to influence their work, for example by validating that the corporation is making the 
right priorities. Investors’ legitimacy is likely also strengthened by the fact that they 
do  not  forward  unreasonable  requests,  but  that  their  claims  are  in  line  with 
corporations’ goals – there is generally no conflict between shareholder demands 
and the corporate agenda, according  to the interviews in this study. And this is 
likely what has spurred the fact that most of the suggestions that investors have 
forwarded have been accepted by the interviewed corporations, whether it concerns 
more detailed reporting, routines for whistle blowing, or adopting an environmental 
policy. 
This is contrary to the findings by Van Buren and Paul (2000), who found that 
corporations view claims by SRI-oriented shareholders as illegitimate. This may be 
a result of the maturing of CSR during the ten years that have passed since they 
conducted their study. It may also be that the US shareholders that were in focus in 
their study and the Swedish shareholders which are in focus in mine, use different 
approaches, i.e. more or less confrontational approaches, which renders different 
responses from corporations.  
As a final reflection, and based on conversation with  investors and engagement 
consultants in this study, a key to increasing investor influence on CSR is likely 
found in the large pool of “conventional” investors who are currently not engaging 
with  corporations  on  CSR.  As  stated  by  corporate  respondents  in  the  study, 
“conventional” investors do not show much interest in CSR, and corporations are 
for the most part not proactive in informing them about such matters. As far as the 
investor community goes, CSR remains the separate interest of a limited number of 
actors. The claims of SRI-oriented shareholders would likely be more salient in the 
future  if  conventional  investors  also  started  to  bring  up  CSR  in  their 20 
 
communications with corporations, as this would not only increase the legitimacy 
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